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Abstract
Several East Asian countries, in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, are considering an expansion of their social safety net programs. 
In many cases, existing delivery mechanisms for social assistance in 
the region tend to be basic, in line with the small size of programs. In 
a context of coverage expansion and proliferation of new programs, 
the risk of creating increasingly complex systems characterized by 
cross-incentives is high. Lack of coordination, ambiguous criteria for 
identifying and selecting beneficiaries, low administrative capacity, 
lack of transparency and limited beneficiary participation pose risks 
for program effectiveness and can decrease accountability. Good 
governance can improve program outcomes through effective program 
coordination, stronger accountability arrangements, provider incentives 
and greater transparency and participation.  This paper proposes an 
analytical framework to systematically identify governance risks and 
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Several East Asian countries, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, are considering 
an expansion of their social safety net programs. In many cases, existing delivery 
mechanisms for social assistance in the region tend to be basic, in line with the small size of 
programs. In a context of coverage expansion and proliferation of new programs, the risk of 
creating increasingly complex systems characterized by cross-incentives is high. Lack of 
coordination, ambiguous criteria for identifying and selecting beneficiaries, low 
administrative capacity, lack of transparency and limited beneficiary participation pose risks 
for program effectiveness and can decrease accountability. Good governance can improve 
program outcomes through effective program coordination, stronger accountability 
arrangements, provider incentives and greater transparency and participation.  This paper 
proposes an analytical framework to systematically identify governance risks and constraints 
which, if removed, could improve the outcomes of modern social assistance programs.  
 
JEL Classification: I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs; 
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs 
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I.  Introduction 
1.1 Scope and objective 
The ASEAN region
1 in recent years has seen a major expansion in Social Safety Net (SSN) 
programs. Prior to 1997, ASEAN governments generally played the role of regulator rather 
than provider of SSN. Programs were typically limited to public insurance schemes in the 
form of retirement and health benefits and provided only to a limited segment of the 
population. The 1997 East Asian financial crisis was a catalyst for change in social safety net 
provisions; it gave new urgency to the development of safety nets, and a number of wide-
reaching programs with broader social mandates were implemented under post-crisis 
interventions, but momentum was at least partially lost as economies quickly started 
recovering. 
The recent food, fuel and financial crises have resulted in increased pressures on existing 
social safety net structures and expenditures in a number of ASEAN countries. The economic 
downturn that followed increased the likelihood of greater numbers living in extreme 
poverty, as well as the financial pressures on developing country governments (Fiszbein, 
Schady et al. 2009). Economic stress has exacerbated demand for social programs as well as 
the need to exploit scarce public resources to the fullest. Ensuring that programs achieve 
results is essential for their sustainability, and thus the quality of service delivery must 
become a priority. In the case of SSN and cash transfers in particular, this translates into 
making sure that the right people receive the right amount of benefit at the right time, 
in a transparent and efficient manner and with minimum error and misuse. There is 
evidence that in several SSN programs in the region coverage is limited, targeting can be 




1 This work was made possible thanks to support from AusAID for research on ASEAN countries with the 
objective of improving the ability of ASEAN member states to develop more effective and sustainable social 
protection interventions with greater regional coherence. This focus on ASEAN countries is particularly 
relevant in the context of the increasing regional integration and aims to strengthen and build upon existing 





From a governance perspective, problems include: coordination issues between agencies and 
decentralized levels of government in the overall social protection system; unclear 
institutional responsibilities that translate into diffusion of responsibilities, ambiguous and 
non transparent “rules of the game” that increase opportunities for discretion, conflicting 
systems of accountability, lack of voice, low implementation capacity and inadequate 
monitoring and evaluation and grievance redress systems among others. Addressing these 
governance challenges would lead to a more effective use of scarce resources and reduce 
unwanted outcomes such as poor targeting, limited coverage, and prevalence of error fraud 
and corruption (EFC).  
This is corroborated by evidence from elsewhere. Reducing EFC can generate additional 
funds and improve the efficient use of public resources to improve program outcomes (van 
Stolk and Tesliuc 2010). Even a small fraction of misappropriated benefits may add up to 
large sums of money with high opportunity costs.  On average, social protection spending 
represents 15.7% of GDP in developed countries, 7.4% in middle-income countries (MICs) 
and 3.8% in low-income countries (LICs).
2 A 2006 international benchmark study on fraud 
and error in social security systems of OECD countries puts the range of fraud and error in 
social protection systems between two to five percent of overall government expenditure on 
                                                            
2 World Bank 2007 FEC SSN Primer note. 6 
 
social security.
3 EFC is likely to be more prevalent in social protection programs of less 
developed countries as a proportion of overall spending compared to OECD countries due in 
part to the limited administrative capacity, absence of adequate monitoring and of clear 
evidence-based strategies to combat EFC. Social safety nets in particular stand at greater 
governance risk due to their inherent design features. Programs are targeted to poor 
households, but poverty status changes over time and eligibility tends to be hard to verify. 
Responsibilities for implementing programs are often shared across government levels and 
agencies, diffusing responsibility and hindering accountability. Finally, beneficiaries tend to 
suffer from exclusion and have limited voice. This suggests that actions aimed at reducing 
EFC and, more broadly, at strengthening governance and program administration of safety 
net programs which deal with significant amounts of cash, can contribute to improved 
outcomes.  
 
This report proposes an analytical framework and diagnostic resource to review governance 
dimensions of specific SSN programs and how these might be strengthened. It intends to 
provide guidance to World Bank staff, donors and policy makers interested in strengthening 
program administration and mitigating potential governance risks within social assistance 
programs. The diagnostic resource is based on what we know about good practice elsewhere. 
The report uses information available from other regions in the world, for instance the Latin 
American Caribbean (LAC) region, as well as experiences of OECD countries which 
highlight governance challenges and ways these have been addressed in a range of SSN 
programs. The background country studies provide more in-depth information about 
individual programs’ administration, and are aimed more directly at country specific 
audience and program managers.  
                                                            
3 NAO (2006), International benchmark of fraud and error in social security administrations, (HC 1387, 
Session 2005-2006) 7 
 
SSN programs are mostly defined as non-contributory 
transfer programs targeted to the poor. They typically 
include measures that help beneficiaries to alleviate 
extreme poverty or help them make decisions to increase 
human capital. SSN programs typically include (taken 
from Grosh et al 2008)
4: 
  unconditional or conditional cash transfers;  
  in-kind transfers such as school feeding programs; 
  price subsidies for households such as for energy 
or food;  
  jobs on labor-intensive public work schemes 
(workfare); and 
  fee waivers for essential services, healthcare, 
schooling etc.  (including non-contributory health 
insurance) 
This report explores the governance dimensions of SSN programs in the ASEAN region by 
taking an in-depth look at a selection of social safety net programs in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  This narrowing of focus is important given the large 
number and variability of social safety net programs in operation across ASEAN member 
states. The selection of programs plays into some developing trends in the choice of social 
safety nets by ASEAN member states of different levels of income, geographical size, 
population and administrative capacity: 
  The Jamkesmas Health Insurance for the poor scheme in Indonesia, a national health 
insurance program targeted at the poor and the near poor. Poor households (around 19 
million households) receive a health card which entitles them to a free comprehensive 
package of health service from primary health care to secondary and even higher 




Error, Fraud and Corruption 
(EFC)  
Error is an unintentional violation of 
program or benefit rules that result in 
the wrong benefit amount being paid 
or in payment to an ineligible 
applicant.  
Fraud occurs when a claimant 
deliberately makes a false statement 
or conceals or distorts relevant 
information regarding program 
eligibility or level of benefits.  
Corruption commonly involves 
manipulation of beneficiary rosters, 
for example, registering ineligible 
beneficiaries to garner political 
support, staff accepting illegal 
payments from eligible or ineligible 
beneficiaries, or diversion of funds to 
ghost beneficiaries or other illegal 
channels 8 
 
  The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines, a national CCT 
program covering 1 million beneficiary households with a plan to scale up to 2.3 
million households by 2011. The program provides a stipend on a quarterly basis to 
households provided they meet certain health and education conditions. 
  Vietnam’s national social assistance program under Decree 67, including cash 
transfers to orphans, children and adolescents deprived of parental care, elderly living 
alone, people above the age of 85 without a pension, severely disabled and unable to 
work, mentally disabled and poor single parents. The recent widening of eligibility 
criteria has led to a considerable increase in the number of beneficiaries from 416,000 
in 2005 to about one million in 2008, accounting for around 1.2 percent of the 
population.  
  The planned use of a national public works scheme in Cambodia as part of the 
National Social Protection Strategy. The two public works programs considered in 
this analysis are the WFP’s Food for Work scheme, reaching over 20,000 households 
in food insecure areas every year and the Cash for Work pilot (under the Emergency 
and Food Assistance Project – EFAP – supported by the ADB), which has also 
reached about 20,000 households since it first started in 2008. 
 
1.2 Defining Governance 
There are many ways of defining governance. The Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy 
of the World Bank defines governance as “the manner in which public officials and 
institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public 
goods and services” (World Bank 2007).  For human development programs governance 
analysis reflects mostly on the relationship between the nature of governance and service 
delivery in health, education, and increasingly social protection (see for example, Fiszbein, 
Ringold, and Rogers 2009 or Lewis and Petterson 2009). In another formulation, governance 
in social protection can be defined as the set of incentives and accountability relationships 
that influence the way in which providers are held accountable for their behaviors and 
ability to deliver services with quality and efficiency
5. From an operational perspective this 
translates simply into (i) the rules of the game; (ii) the roles and responsibilities; and (iii) 
                                                            
5 Rules, Roles and Controls: Governance in Social Protection, Draft Background Paper for the World Bank 
Social Protection Strategy 9 
 
control and accountability measures
6. Effective governance arrangements drive 
implementation and affect outcomes through improving coordination of programs, shaping 
accountability and incentives for providers and promoting transparency and participation (see 
World Development Report 2004). There is ample evidence that supports the link between 
improved governance and development outcomes (Hyden et. al 2004, Campos and Pradhan 
2007, ODI 2006). Hence, investing in strengthening and improving governance in programs 
would lead to better development outcomes.  
In this paper we introduce an analytical framework to help SSN program staff and managers 
identify governance risks and constraints which, if removed, could improve the outcome of 
SSN as they are scaled up in the ASEAN region. However, improving governance requires 
looking at the “full picture”. Many governance challenges are not unique to social protection 
and would be best addressed in the context of broader public sector reforms that strive to 
enhance performance across sectors, for example through better performance management 
systems, performance-based budgeting, civil service reform, etc. While this goes beyond the 
scope of this report, it is important to keep in mind that governance interventions are possible 
at different levels. Here we will focus on the program (micro) and meso levels, as they are 
the ones on which program staff are more likely to have room to shape design and influence 
implementation.  
  Macro-level: This level reflects on how the sector is embedded in the wider 
institutional configuration. For instance, it would consider the independence of the 
supreme audit institution (SAI), the civil service code or framework, the rule of law, 
and coordination in the core executive.  
  Meso-level: This level looks at sector arrangements, for instance the institutional 
arrangements between ministries involved in administering (implementing) and 
governing (defining policy oversight and monitoring) the social safety net.  
  Micro-level: This level looks at the responsibilities of different actors and 






The report takes an evidence-based approach focusing on the governance challenges that 
SSN in the ASEAN region face. Good examples exist on how SSN programs have been 
strengthened from a governance perspective (see for example the review of SSN in the Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) region, World Bank 2007) and more importantly on what 
works in terms of particular outcomes (for example see the example of error, fraud and 
corruption in van Stolk and Tesliuc 2010 or Attanasio et al. on CCTs 2005).  
However, good practice from one country is not immediately transferrable to another.   
Critical factors that shape program performance include the political economy at the country 
or sector level (see Fritz 2009), administrative constraints, public sector performance and 
accountability relationships, and whether citizens and beneficiaries are able to demand 
services and provide oversight to program implementation. Therefore, the report does not 
intend to be prescriptive or normative. Rather, it provides a framework to think about 
governance in social safety nets and attempts to provide examples that policy-makers can 
learn from to better understand the governance implications associated with their programs. 
From an operational perspective, it is useful to identify the different stages of a SSN 
program. In each stage different stakeholders are involved. This is important in identifying 
not just the challenges that exist in each stage of a process but also whom they might affect 
and who can exercise control over them. This speaks to a process analysis, looking at 
program implementation stages from the entry of the beneficiary in a SSN program to the 
exit (see Campos and Pradhan [Eds] 2007).  From literature review and experience, the report 
derives a range of questions that program staff can consider and groups these questions along 
the stages of a SSN program. 
II.  An analytical framework to incorporate Governance in SSN  
2.1 Basic framework 
The conceptual model is simple. The underlying intervention logic is that improvements in 
governance would contribute to the reduction of unwanted outcomes such as poor targeting 
and error, fraud, and corruption (EFC) and improve coverage, which in turn would contribute 11 
 
to the improvement of the quality of service delivery and of human development outcomes 
(see also Fiszbein, Ringold and Rogers 2009).
7 The design of SSN should then consider how 
to address governance challenges.   
Figure 2.   An Analytical Framework to Understand Governance in SSN 
 
As indicated in the framework (see figure 2) a number of inter-related challenges exist which 
include: supply-side issues (performance incentives, accountability relationships); demand 
driven governance (citizen and beneficiary “Voice” to hold service providers accountable); 
and administrative capacity to deliver a complex program to large numbers of beneficiaries 
over a wide geographically dispersed area. A set of cross-cutting governance principles 
relating to (i) clarity of institutional responsibilities and accountability, (ii) alignment of 
performance incentives, (iii) transparency and program information disclosure, (iv) rule of 
law, (v) financial management and (vi) social accountability are embedded within the 
framework. These governance principles inform “risks” that operational staff might consider 
                                                            
7 It is important to note that this resource takes the view that improvements in governance contribute to better 
human development outcomes. This is based on emerging evidence (see Hyden et al 2006). The report 
acknowledges as pointed out in a number of papers that isolating the impact of governance on human 
development outcomes is particularly challenging (see ODI 2006 and more recently Fiszbein, Ringold and 
Rogers 2009).  12 
 
along each stage of a SSN program, and are described below.  As mentioned earlier all of 
these are nested within the wider “political economy” of the country context which shapes 
what is or not feasible to propose as new program design or reform measures for existing 
programs.  
 
Administrative Systems: The framework distinguishes between administrative capacity and 
governance by looking at mechanisms that strengthen both “internal” and “external 
accountability
8”. Administrative capacity challenges that programs face affect not only 
program outcomes but also the “tool box” program managers have available to mitigate 
governance related risks. While governance principles are universal, the specific governance 
tools available to ensure these principles are implemented are likely to be very different in 
middle income versus low income countries for example. Therefore, administrative 
challenges have to do with a set of “enabling conditions” for action. This is an important 
point, as it relates to what is feasible in different contexts. Lack of administrative capacity 
can put limits on the way that the rules of the game are implemented as well as on the tools 
available to mitigate governance risks. Frequently, considerations on administrative capacity 
are made when drawing up recommendations. However, because of its perceived importance 
as a driving factor of the available governance tools available, here it is considered as part of 
the framework itself. For our current purpose, we will consider administrative capacity as 
including factors such as: (i) the existence of a modern MIS (full automation of MIS systems 
might be possible in a high-capacity environment, but not in a low-capacity fragile state); and 
(ii) adequate human and financial resources to administer a safety net program. Most 
interventions to improve administrative capacity are not specific to social protection sector 
and programs. Rather, they are part of broader public sector reform issues which significantly 
affects service delivery. 
                                                            
8 Internal accountability relates to rules and regulations by which program staff and managers deliver on their 
roles and responsibilities. Clarity of roles and responsibility is an essential element of internal accountability. 
External accountability refers to the agencies compact to deliver services to program beneficiaries and to be 
held accountable by independent institutions of accountability (audit, anti-corruption agency, judiciary), 
legislature, and beneficiaries (see WDR 2004). 13 
 
Investments in administrative capacity can be cost-effective and contribute to better use of 
existing resources. An example from Canada shows that increased staff training in Service 
Canada on how to reduce processing errors coupled with holding managers to account for 
errors in a results-based framework, proved effective in reducing processing errors in the 
means-tested income program (NAO 2006). The latter also reflects on aligning incentives 
with responsibilities. The evidence from the OECD shows that increased use of data-
matching on files allows social security administrators to target scarce detection resources 
(such as fraud investigators) on those cases with the highest probability of fraud.  This 
highlights that sometimes investment in ICT can be very cost-effective in the longer-run 
(NAO 2006). Electronic systems used for processing also tend to cut down the number of 
errors in processing and payment systems (NAO 2006). They also allow for a more 
systematic and integrated MIS. However, the effectiveness of investments in administrative 
capacity can be limited by factors beyond the control of program managers, such as those 
that relate to the extent of “political influence” on the overall administration of the program. 
If this is the case, improved administrative systems and better human/financial resources will 
not yield results.  
 
Accountability and Incentive Relationships:  Institutional relationships in which the actors 
are accountable to each other and have the right incentive to perform contribute to quality of 
service delivery. On the supply side, we will focus on the elements that contribute to 
successful accountability relationships between service providers and policy makers
9.  
  Clarity of institutional responsibilities and accountability -  a key factor to ensure 
service providers are held accountable for program outcomes. If multiple organizations 
or process steps are involved responsibility is diffused and no one is responsible. 
Evidence shows that clear job description, standard operating procedures, and 
functional separation avoids duplication of tasks, ensures that tasks are carried out and 
allows accountability. Functional separation ensures for instance that staff who process 
an application are not the same as those paying the beneficiary, reducing corruption 
risks. Often clear delineation between jobs also leads to professional certification and 
targeted training. Most social security administrations in OECD countries have taken 
                                                            
9 In many cases in the delivery of safety nets, the service provider is the government itself, but this need not be 
the case.   14 
 
steps to reduce the complexity of administration by eliminating unnecessary process 
steps that contribute to program risk, as this contributes to processing errors. 
  Alignment of performance incentives to responsibilities - Aligning incentives to 
responsibilities ensures that staff have the right incentive to administer the program.  
For example in Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program, determination of eligibility is managed 
at a centralized level based on a means test. However, many aspects of Bolsa’s 
operations are managed by municipalities. The Ministry of Social Development 
provides a performance-based financial incentive to municipalities to promote good 
implementation. Specifically, the Ministry monitors municipal implementation quality 
using a four point scale, which covers key indicators of registration quality and 
verification of compliance with conditionalities. Based on the scores, the Ministry pays 
a pro-rated administrative cost subsidy. Poor performers do not qualify for this subsidy, 
but are offered technical assistance to improve performance.   
  Transparency and program information disclosure:  (a) capturing information on the 
program  improves functions;   monitoring and evaluation help  provide information for 
accountability and lessons learned to all stakeholders; and (b) transparency among 
stakeholders leads to better program outcomes and reduces error, fraud and 
corruption. Disclosure and transparency relate to two main aspects: (i) program results 
and (ii) program rules, including eligibility criteria, benefits, existing conditionalities, 
etc. Given the type of beneficiaries of social assistance program, transparency is not 
sufficient to guarantee real access to information and in many cases must be 
accompanied by active communication strategies and the involvement of civil society. 
This is particularly true in context in which program rules may change, such as when 
new programs are introduced or there is an expansion of eligibility criteria. In India’s 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) the program adopts a “proactive 
disclosure” of program information approach. Information is disclosed to the public 
through boards at the village level, all NREGA documents are digitized and regularly 
uploaded to the MIS information and all information requests should be satisfied within 
seven days. NREGA data is made available to the public through its national web portal 
(Aiyar and Samji 2009).  
  Rule of law to ensure sanctions against non compliance. Ensuring that there are 
administrative or legal redress for non compliance with program rules. The OECD 
experience shows that sanctions are an effective deterrent and that most systems have 
increased the use of sanctions (against staff and beneficiaries). In the UK, the sanctions 
policy is based on administrative penalties, cautions, recovery of payments, and 
prosecutions. There are clear guidelines on what irregularities are, when a sanction is 
applied, as well as which organizational resources are responsible for enforcement 
  Control mechanisms and oversight.  Control mechanisms are the elements of the 
system that provide oversight and help ensure that the incentives set up between the 15 
 
policy-makers, providers and beneficiaries function well. This includes internal and 
external audits and spot checks and increasingly the use of risk-based approaches in a 
given context. For cash transfers,  the area of financial management is particularly 
sensitive.  Controls may include systematic, secure systems for monitoring distribution, 
collection, and processing payments (use of ICT and smart cards for example). Many of 
these are top-down measures, but it is in the area of controls that synergy between 
supply and demand sides of governance are key to ensure accountability. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, safety net programs use a combination of tools such as 
audits, spot-checks, transparency and participation measures supported by strong 
judicial prosecution of misuse as a means to strengthen governance and reduce EFC. 
Table 1 provides a summary of these measures and the constraints to their effectiveness 
in SSN programs. 16 
 
Table 1: Control and accountability mechanisms used in SSN programs in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region 
Mechanisms  Pros   Cons 
Top down 
Supreme Audit Institution  Country-wide   Standing varies between countries 
Call centres  Client facing, cost-effective, and useful in multi-
tier systems  
Needs to operate well or can backfire 
Public prosecutors  Useful deterrent for corruption and to foster 
accountability 
Impact limited more widely and can be 
expensive 
Spot checks  Quick feedback on implementation of program  None  
Data-matching  Cost-effective and quick  Need to have IT, expertise and unique identifiers 
Concurrent audits  Provides timely information that can be acted 
upon 
Costly 
Public disclosure of program 
information 
Fosters transparency and shared understanding  Privacy issues 
Evaluation  Basic accountability tool  Takes a long time and expensive 
Bottom up 
Neighbourhood and municipal 
committees 
Builds on skills and may be closer to beneficiary  Depends on volunteers and role needs to be 
defined carefully 
Committees of mothers  Beneficiary empowerment  Depends on volunteers who may become 
intermediaries 
Civil society  Third party close to beneficiary  Potential conflict of interest 
Source:  World Bank 2007 
 
Voice:  Demand-based interventions that complement formal accountability mechanisms are 
a key feature of effective SSN programs. These mechanisms help ensure that citizens and 
beneficiaries can “voice” complaints regarding program administration, and seek redress on 
grievances related to the quality of program delivery or payment of benefits
10. Most program 
                                                            
10 A debate exists regarding whether grievance redress and complaints mechanisms are demand or supply side 
measures (as they are formal channels provided as part of the supply of services). We include most of the 
discussion here under the demand side and the challenges related to providing “voice” to program beneficiaries. 
However, we recognize that GRS are formal channels that fall under the “supply side” and we wish to stress the 
importance of the complementarity of the demand/supply sides in order to implement a functioning GRS.  17 
 
use some form of end-user feedback or independent monitoring to provide program checks 
independent of MIS and program audits. For instance, the Heads of Household Program in 
Argentina is a large-scale emergency workfare program established during the 2001-2 
economic crisis. The Ministry of Labor is the responsible national agency and registration is 
decentralized through municipalities and civil society/political organizations. A set of 
complaint resolution tools has been established, including: (a) Toll free hotlines manned by 
call centers addressing questions on payment dates, eligibility and for reporting ineligible 
beneficiaries; (b) a Commission in the Ministry of Labor to handle allegations of program 
abuse or complaints; (c) Criminal offenses are referred to a Federal Prosecutor of the Social 
Security System; and (d) a monthly cross-checking of databases. This approach combines 
complaint lines with clear sanctions that can be enforced. Several innovative examples exist 
of SSN programs which incorporate demand based interventions into program design as 





Political Economy:  Political economy relates to “the interaction of political and economic 
processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and 
Box 1. Program Applications of Demand Based Governance Interventions 
Making information available to stakeholders: a well-known example of the importance of transparency for 
program effectiveness is the experience of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Several 
studies highlighted the poor performance of many workfare programs in India, where often money did not reach 
intended beneficiaries, and pointed at a generalized lack of transparency and accountability. The implementation 
of the Right to Information Act in 2005 offered the basis for the program to introduce a number of innovative 
accountability measures. All of these build on “proactive disclosure” of program information. NREGA guidelines 
require that information is disclosed to the public through boards at the village level, and that all information 
requests related to NREGA are satisfied within seven days. Moreover, all NREGA documents are digitized and 
regularly uploaded to the MIS at the state and central levels. All the data is available to the public. The key 
innovation and what has made this a celebrated case study, however, is the institutionalization of Social Audits 
through which this information is socialized at the local level, effectively allowing citizens to understand and use 
this information to enhance accountability. The Social Audit process itself is highly participatory: after collecting 
all the relevant information, village auditors conduct information sharing sessions which help citizens understand 
the scheme and allow discussion over implementation. Evaluations of the social audit process in Andhra Pradesh 
showed significant improvements in levels of awareness among program beneficiaries, which have in turn led to 
improvements in program implementation (in combination with government support of the process, which makes 
immediate grievance redress possible).   
Promoting bottom-up social accountability: includes beneficiaries and civil society becoming involved in key 
stages of a SSN to hold service providers to account and complement existing accountability mechanisms This 
involvement can range from beneficiary selection to verification and monitoring. However, such involvement 
should also reflect on who should be involved and when. There is a huge variance between SSN programs. For 
instance, in Indonesia PNPM Generasi provides block grant to communities at the village-level. Communities, 
working together with program facilitators and front-line health and education workers, identify constraints to 
improving 12 priority pre-identified health and education indicators. Communities then identify activities that can 
overcome common constraints, and use Generasi block grants to finance these activities. For education, activities 
range from building satellite classrooms in remote hamlets to providing scholarships and buying bicycles, school 
uniforms, shoes and bags for school-aged children from poor households. For health, many communities subsidize 
prenatal and postnatal care, or hire additional midwifes. Each community elects an 11-member village 
management team, which monitors community performance towards achieving the health and education 
indicators, for example, regularly checking of primary school attendance and recording of the number of prenatal 
checkups undergone by each pregnant mother. Communities use monitoring results to reallocate Generasi funds 
throughout implementation to support activities aimed at indicators for which progress is lagging.   
Supporting Grievance Redress Mechanisms: In the Dominican Republic CCT program Solidaridad complaints 
forms are available to all beneficiaries, who can file claims individually or in a group. Additionally, to enhance 
community participation, the Government recently created a “social network” (Red Social) of community-based 
organizations. The “social network” receives and channels claims about the program and also seeks to improve 
communication between program and beneficiaries. Complaint forms are received by Regional Committees and 
forwarded to the appropriate agency: the Single Beneficiary Registry (SIUBEN) for targeting and household data 
issues; the Social Transfer Office (ADESS) for issues about payment; and the Solidaridad Central Office for 
problems with information on beneficiary rights and responsibilities and access to social services (health centers 
and schools). Claims must be answered in writing within 30 days. The system does not yet allow follow up for 
claims that do not relate directly to the CCT program, such as those associated with the provision of health and 
education services.  19 
 
individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over 
time” (see http://www.gsdrc.org/dpcs/open/PO58.pdf  and 
www.oecd.org/dac/governace/politicaleconomy ). This is particularly pertinent in the case of 
SSNs. Safety net programs can be large, are directly targeted at individual households, and 
can potentially be used by political leaders as populist programs to win re-election. 
Experience from LAC has shown that programs can show bias in geographical targeting to 
ensure that opposition areas receive less funds or households are excluded from the program.  
An interesting study from Colombia showed that local mayors manipulated a national 
poverty index around election time to include additional households near the poverty line, 
particularly in closely contested municipalities (see Camacho and Conover 2009). The 
implications of “political economy” influencing the administration, targeting, and scaling-up 
of programs in the ASEAN countries is apparent. This is of special importance in democratic 
systems with competitive national and local elections.  In our framework we identify Context 
and Political Economy as the key factors influencing the effectiveness of Administrative 
systems, Accountability and Voice as well as each step in the program chain. 
Risk:   Mapping of program risk can take place at several levels. Risk can be identified at the 
country level in terms of the overall accountability environment (see for example 
Transparency International National Integrity Assessments www.transaprency.org/policy). 
There are a number of assessment methodologies used by OECD countries to assess 
institutional integrity i.e. the overall risks associated with the management practices and 
internal controls of a particular public sector agency (see OECD, 2005). Perception surveys 
and independent Civil Society Organizations’ reviews of agency service delivery provide an 
external perception of program risk (see ICW Jamkesmas review 2008). Agency external 
audit reports provide valuable information on program vulnerabilities and risks through 
identification of observations and deviations from program policies and rules. Using a 
combination of these techniques can provide a useful overall assessment of institutional risk. 
Identifying and mitigating program risk involves mapping out the key steps in the program 
process and identifying vulnerabilities or weaknesses. The 4P program in the Philippines 
provides a good example of process risk-mapping and mitigation of key vulnerabilities 
identified (see box). Finally there is a temporal dimension of risk. During program 20 
 
implementation new issues may emerge and previously identified risks may no longer be 
relevant, hence the need for robust monitoring systems that provide accurate information on 
problems/risks emerging during implementation (for example through complaints registered, 
audits observation, and findings from third party monitoring reports).  
 
 
III.  Along the program chain 
The analytical framework and the key governance principles described above form the basis 
for the analysis that follows. In considering the governance aspects of safety nets, it is useful 
to reflect on the different program stages, the potential risks, and the stakeholders involved in 
each one of them. There are a number of ways in which these stages can be represented, and 
some degree of overlap and variation can be expected, particularly in the case of safety net 
programs with different structures such as cash transfers, health insurance and public works. 
Nonetheless, thinking through the different steps of program implementation is a useful way 
to make governance analysis immediately valuable from an operational perspective. Grosh et 
al (2008) usefully introduce an overview of processes and stakeholders involved in a safety 
net program,
11 which in this report has been slightly adapted to the following four stages
12 
where governance dimensions are of particular interest: 
                                                            
11 This framework was adapted from Baldeon and Arribas-Banos 2008.  
12 The description of stages was in places adapted from World Bank 2007.  
Box 2. Risk Mapping in the Philippines 4P 
The 4Ps underwent a process risk mapping (PRM) exercise to identify and mitigate vulnerability leaks in key 
stages of the program implementation. The PRM identified and highlighted decision-points where program 
implementers at the national and sub-national levels have a high degree of discretion, unguided by project 
procedures. Conducted jointly with the World Bank, the PRM for 4Ps mapped out decision-making points step-
by-step for geographic selection, household targeting, registration, compliance monitoring and payment. Wide 
discretion opens up the potential for fraud or corruption. The findings of the PRM exercise served as inputs in 
devising measures to mitigate the risks in implementing the 4Ps. The review of 4Ps implementation experience 
in the pilot phase identified points of vulnerability in the program delivery chain. The exercise found that most 
of the potential problems were attributed to the rapid scale-up of the program relative to the implementing 
capacity of DSWD and the readiness of systems in place to operationalize the 4Ps. Significant attention has 
since been placed on strengthening the staffing of key areas of program implementation. 21 
 
  Beneficiary selection (entry): This stage refers to the entry of beneficiaries in the 
system and reflects not only on the targeting mechanisms (geographical, means-
tested, community participation), but also on the procedures in place on the ground 
for selecting beneficiaries. It therefore includes socialization and communication 
strategies in place to inform potential beneficiaries about the program and its 
eligibility requirements, as well as the role of the community in terms of ‘social 
auditing’ and ensuring compliance. 
  Processing of benefit applications (registration and eligibility verification): This 
stage refers to the actual process of registration of benefits, how files are processed at 
different levels of the administration and what verification takes place on the 
eligibility of the application at the outset of the claim.  
  Payment of benefits: This stage represents not only the delivery of payments but also 
the process of determining the amount, frequency, and mechanisms for transfer of 
funds.  
  Verification and monitoring: This refers to what monitoring and verification takes 
place during the period of the claim and at what level. It includes the use of 
management information systems, audits, quality control mechanisms, complaint 
management, social controls, and evaluation of impact assessment. It also reflects on 
policies with regards to the consequences of non-compliance.  
For each of these stages, and for the cross-cutting themes relating to institutional structure, 
we will identify below the main governance and administration elements that should be 
considered in the design of safety net programs. Key diagnostic questions are highlighted to 
guide the reader through the main points, but a more comprehensive list of questions per 
stage can be found in the annex (see Annex 2). This list can form the basis for the 
development of more in-depth questionnaires which necessarily need to be tailored to 
country-specific contexts. Such an exercise was conducted in the four ASEAN “case-study” 
programs chosen for this report, and some of the findings will help illustrate the discussion 
and conclusions that follow. As mentioned above, the four ASEAN SSN programs we have 
chosen to illustrate the program chain include: 
  The Jamkesmas Health Insurance for the poor scheme in Indonesia, a national health 
insurance program targeted at the poor and the near poor. Poor households (around 19 
million households) receive a health card which entitles them to a free comprehensive 22 
 
package of health service from primary health care to secondary and even higher 
level of care.  
  The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines, a national CCT 
program covering 1 million beneficiary households with a plan to scale up to 2.3 
million households by 2011. The program provides a stipend on a quarterly basis to 
households provided they meet certain health and education conditions. 
  Vietnam’s national social assistance program under Decree 67, including cash 
transfers to orphans, children and adolescents deprived of parental care, elderly living 
alone, people above the age of 85 without a pension, severely disabled unable to 
work, mentally disabled and poor single parents. The recent widening of eligibility 
criteria has led to a considerable increase in the number of beneficiaries from 416,000 
in 2005 to about one million in 2008, accounting for around 1.2 percent of the 
population.  
  The planned use of a national public works scheme in Cambodia as part of the 
National Social Protection Strategy. The two public works programs considered in 
this analysis are the WFP’s Food for Work scheme, reaching over 20,000 households 
in food insecure areas every year and the ADB’s Cash for Work pilot (under the 
Emergency and Food Assistance Project), which has also reached about 20,000 
households since it first started in 2008. 
These programs range in complexity from those with a conditional element to the benefit 
(Philippines), to a poverty targeted health insurance schemes in a large decentralized setting 
(Indonesia); to those which provide cash payments to the poor in low to lower middle income 
countries (Cambodia and Vietnam). 
The program examples illustrate the challenges faced by managers and administrators in 
identifying and mitigating overall program risk and ensuring that the right benefits get to the 
right beneficiaries, quickly in a transparent and efficient manner with minimum error and 
misuse. Due to the nature and development stage of the programs analyzed, these case 
studies have focused on “first generation” issues such as targeting, coverage, reliability of 
payments more than on “second generation” issues related to graduation from programs. 
When programs are relatively young, fiduciary oversight, mitigation of error, fraud and 
corruption, transparency and accountability tend to be immediate concerns. Once systems are 
more developed and systematized, and programs run smoothly, attention tends to shift to 
other issues such as exit from the program. The nature of the governance environment in the 23 
 
four countries illustrates some of the risks we have highlighted in the previous section, and 
provides some examples of mitigation techniques currently used by ASEAN countries to 
reduce program risk.  
3.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
Clarity of institutional responsibilities is a cross-cutting issue that must be considered before 
looking at individual program implementation stages. Social safety net provision in ASEAN 
countries and elsewhere has often been reactive, with new programs initially implemented in 
an ad hoc, fragmented, manner. As a result, programs often lack strategic planning and a 
clear institutional structure. This can become a significant problem as programs grow in size 
and scope, and as new programs are implemented which can overlap with existing 
administrative structures. This lack of coordination poses a risk for program effectiveness.  
 
CCT programs in particular present significant coordination challenges due to the need to 
ensure service supply and enforce conditionalities. Institutional clarity is key to ensure that 
supply-side services are provided, that compliance monitoring by schools and health clinics 
is conducted, and that monitoring and oversight at the local levels is effective. Upon the 
creation of the Philippines CCT program (4Ps) in 2007 the government formalized the 
institutional arrangement among the agencies involved through a series of government 
administrative orders.
13 This institutional structure helps ensure that the responsibilities and 
                                                            
13 The institutional arrangement among government agencies in the implementation of 4Ps was formalized in 
the following: Memorandum Circular  9 Series of 2007, Creating the Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino (APP) Program 
National Advisory Committees and Defining Their Roles and Responsibilities;  Administrative Order 16, Series 
of 2008, Guidelines on the Implementation of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps); and Joint 
Key questions – Roles and Responsibilities 
  How many tiers are involved in program administration?  
  What are the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government for financing, 
delivering, monitoring programs? 
  Are these roles clearly defined and communicated? 
  How is coordination ensured within and across government levels? 
  Are program resources (staff, administrative budget, etc.) commensurate to case load? 
  Are there performance based incentives/penalties? 24 
 
lines of authority are clear between agencies and levels of government in terms of who is 
expected to do what. Moreover, national, regional and municipal advisory committees have 
been created to ensure smooth coordination between relevant government departments and 
ensure the availability of health and education services in the targeted areas. At a higher 
level, coordination across social programs remains harder to achieve. Once again, the 
Philippines has made substantial efforts by establishing an inter-agency National Economic 
and Development Authority – Social Development Committee (NEDA-SDC) Sub-
Committee on Social Protection (SCSP)
14. However, there continues to be a lack of 
coordination between programs, and subsequently, potential overlapping and double 
counting in beneficiary selection. 
Additionally, separation of responsibilities for financing and implementation across 
government levels implies the need to carefully think about the institutional incentive 
structure. Due to the need to redistribute resources national governments typically finance a 
large share of social assistance programs, while local governments often retain significant 
responsibilities in the administration of benefits. Several ASEAN members have chosen 
more decentralized approaches (for example, Vietnam and Cambodia) to program 
administration, which raises issues on the clarity of institutional responsibilities and 
incentives in the implementation of SSN across different government levels. Managing the 
natural tensions of multi-level systems is not easy. But clarity of roles and responsibilities for 
financing (budget allocation), delivering, and monitoring programs at the different levels of 
government are the first step in creating an institutional system in which actors can later be 
held accountable for their performance.   
In Vietnam four levels of government are involved in the administration of social assistance 
benefits. Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders at various levels of government are 
clearly defined: program objectives and guidelines are set at the national level, but 
implementation is left to provincial and district authorities, with a strong role for local agents 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2009, Defining the Institutional Arrangements for the Implementation, 
Monitoring, and Evaluation of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). 
14 SDC Resolution No. 2, series of 2009 25 
 
as well
15.  One district level worker plus commune
16 staff will often handle all aspects of 
beneficiary management, payment, monitoring and reporting, as well as front-line interface 
with beneficiaries. This can lead to significant strain, particularly when beneficiary numbers 
are growing and responsibilities for tracking, training, communication campaigns, 
monitoring and payment increase. Resource constraints prevent the creation of a designated 
cadre of social workers at the district or even commune level in the near future. However, 
formalizing the division of responsibilities, recognizing the professional role of local social 
officers by developing appropriate job descriptions and assigning adequate resources would 
be instrumental to more clearly align policy makers, providers’ and beneficiaries’ incentives.  
In Indonesia the Jamkesmas Program has decentralized responsibilities for selection of 
beneficiaries and implementation to lower levels of government (province, district and 
villages). Overall policy and allocation of funds, based on poverty mapping, are done at the 
central government level. Additionally, since 2008, administration of beneficiary “cards” – 
the basis for receiving free health services – is outsourced to PT ASKES a state-owned 
company that runs the social health insurance for civil servants. Delivery of cards to 
beneficiaries, complaints handling, and monitoring are also decentralized to local 
government officials and local health providers at the district and village
17. Overlaps with 
locally administered health insurance schemes (Jamkesda) are a major issue. It is currently 
estimated that around 200 districts, out of 540, have local health insurance programs 
(Jamkesda). These local schemes have their own eligibility criteria and vary widely in 
benefits package. This can lead to difficulties for the Central Government in monitoring the 
program and developing a roadmap to achieve universal coverage. The challenges mainly 
arise from the absence of clear roles and responsibility across government levels in the 
provision and financing of a minimum benefit package, in accountability of the use of public 
funds to finance the scheme and criteria for beneficiary eligibility.   
                                                            
15 Guidelines, roles and responsibilities of various parties are specified in Circular 09/2007-TT-BLDTBXH at 
the national level, which provides guidance to Provinces on the implementation of Decree 67/2007-ND-CP. 
Individual Provinces are then responsible for issuing further instructions for the District and Commune/Ward 
levels.  
16 The commune is the lowest rural administrative unit (the urban equivalent is a ward).  
17 A recent study conducted by the Center for Health Research (CHRI 2010) found instances of the local village 
head holding onto beneficiary card and using discretion on who should be eligible to receive the cards. 26 
 
Public works programs also require significant coordination and interaction across 
government levels due to the substantial supervision requirements. In Cambodia, three levels 
of government are involved in the implementation of public works projects, with the central 
level responsible for final decisions on most aspects. Communities are engaged in various 
stages of project selection and implementation through a process that builds on existing 
participatory planning mechanisms for infrastructure investment at the village level. So far, 
provinces have played the key role in linking local and central levels. However, 
implementation currently relies heavily on donor partners for coordination and execution as 
well as funding.  In the case of the Emergency and Food Assistance Project (EFAP), an 
emergency operation, it was decided that program coordination should be located within the 
Ministry of Finance because of its institutional strength and experience in financial 
management that would allow funds to be executed rapidly. A clear division of 
responsibilities, with all Ministries involved in policy-level decisions but the Ministry of 
Finance ultimately responsible for implementation, has facilitated execution. Separate 
Provincial Project Management Units (PPMU) were also established in each Province, and 
work with representatives of each line Ministry. The institutional set up appears to be 
appropriate for emergency assistance, but less fitting for a permanent program. In the case of 
the FFW projects, WFP maintains control of project approval and plays a strong role in 
facilitating communication and coordination across government levels. As part of the 
decentralization process, the role of districts is likely to grow, and it will be important to 
think carefully about new roles and responsibilities in this context.  
3.2 Beneficiary Selection 
A common challenge in social safety net provisions is identifying vulnerable households and 
those affected by crises and shocks.  Many ASEAN countries use geographical and poverty 
based indicators to select beneficiaries. For example Indonesia uses a Proxy Means Test for 
its cash transfer program. In recent years Indonesia has also experimented with a community-
based targeting approach linked to its national Poverty Program (PNPM). In a randomized 
test, though the PMT targeting system had less inclusion errors communities expressed 
overall program satisfaction with the community-based targeting system as it was perceived 
as being “fair” (see Wong and Olken 2009). The process to identify and enroll beneficiaries 27 
 
of social safety net programs has very strong implications for program coverage, targeting 
performance and final outcomes. There can also be incentives to manipulate beneficiary 
selection systems to benefit a particular group of beneficiaries (often for political or 
patronage purposes), hence the need to have a clearly defined system with limited discretion. 
In many cases ASEAN countries do not have a robust identification process on which to base 
targeting for social safety net programs. Programs then rely on different methods or 
combination of methods for identifying potential beneficiaries (means testing, geographical, 
community or self-targeting). Regardless of the methods chosen, however, some basic 
principles of transparency and consistency in the application of eligibility criteria apply.  
Social assistance in Vietnam currently relies on categorical targeting and beneficiaries are 
selected through a community-based mechanism with a panel that decides on every 
application. Lists of beneficiaries are posted for 30 days before they are sent for formal 
program enrollment. Eligibility criteria are defined at the central level through administrative 
decrees but they leave some room for discretion, which can make it hard for social officers 
and review panels to make decisions on individual cases. From a governance perspective, the 
high level of involvement of the community in the beneficiary selection process is a strength 
of the Vietnamese system. However, a clarification of eligibility criteria is needed to ensure a 
more transparent application of existing rules and reduce discretion and opportunities for 
misconduct. The eligibility criteria of the various public works programs in Cambodia are 
also transparent and well documented in operational guidelines. A pre-determined set of 
criteria perceived as highly correlated with poverty are identified and used to guide 
communities in the selection of project participants. The village chief plays a strong role in 
this process. However, this selection process involves no formal ranking of households and 
there is room for discretion. In order to increase transparency and improve targeting 
outcomes, where data is available Public Works Programs have started to use the national 
household targeting system (ID Poor) which combines the community selection process with 28 
 
a variation of Proxy Means Testing
18, and ranking beneficiary households explicitly based on 
income.  
In the Philippines the national household targeting system for poverty reduction uses the 
proxy means test (PMT) methodology to identify the poor. The selection process also 
includes community validation to ensure accuracy and increase acceptance at the community 
level. Community screening helps identify errors in the PMT, but it also opens up 
opportunities for political intervention in the list by local chief executives, particularly 
Mayors, by bringing in some subjectivity to the process. The list of potential beneficiaries 
generated through the PMT is publicly posted and potential beneficiaries gather to validate it 
and update household information. Even if households are eligible they cannot become 4Ps 
beneficiaries if they don't participate in the Community Assembly. Department of Social 
Welfare Development (DWSD) estimates that the current system generates low inclusion and 
exclusion errors of about 5 percent.
19The National Household Targeting System for Poverty 
Reduction (NHTS-PR) initially started as a targeting system for CCT, is now a listing of poor 
households nationwide. The NHTS-PR is now not only being used for targeting for CCT, but 
also for the Philippines Health Indigent Program (health insurance for the poor), and the 
database has been shared with Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). 
In Indonesia, the target population for the Jamkesmas program is decided at the Central 
Government level based on  national poverty figures, and beneficiary “quotas” are allocated 
across provinces and districts ”.  This allocation of “quotas” can lead to major discrepancies 
in overall beneficiary numbers and problems in accurate identification of households. A 
recent study conducted by the Center for Health Research, Indonesia (CHRI 2011) in two 
provinces found major discrepancies in the numbers of cards allocated and mis-printing in 
beneficiary names on the cards
20. Local government officials were often found to have 
surplus cards due to errors in the district poverty figures. Beneficiary selection is carried out 
                                                            
18 The PMT aims to objectively determine whether or not a household is poor by statistically estimating the 
household income based on a series of observable household variables closely correlated with income levels. 
19 Estimates as reported in Taradji (2010). 
20 CHRI conducted over 120 Focus Group interviews on Java and Sumatra in 2010-2011 with program 
stakeholders and beneficiaries in 2 provinces and 4 districts 29 
 
at the village and neighborhood level by the village head based on the ‘quota’ and a 
household list provided by the local statistic office (Local BPS) after running a PMT to 
identify eligible beneficiaries. The list is finalized and validated by the district government 
office and submitted to PT ASKES as the appointed third party administrator to manage 
printing of membership cards  and distribution. However, this process varies across regions 
especially in the criteria used to identify eligible households, the identification process, 
efforts to ensure transparency and public involvement in the development of the potential 
beneficiary list, and the distribution of the card. For instance, some districts will involve 
health authorities including their service network, i.e. Puskesmas
21 and village midwives, 
while others only involve village officials in the selection process.  
Once a clear and transparent process for selecting beneficiaries has been established, 
program rules need to be clearly communicated to potential beneficiaries. Socialization and 
communication strategies about the program and its eligibility requirements are key to 
ensuring that eligible beneficiaries can access the program. In Vietnam, information about 
social assistance programs is communicated at village meetings and through the existing 
networks of civil society organizations. Representatives of mass organizations who have 
good knowledge of local households help citizens understand existing programs and 
recommend citizens whom they find eligible. Nonetheless, access to information can be a 
challenge in remote areas and for some vulnerable groups. Similarly, because Cambodia has 
a long history of public works programs, in many areas of the country communities are by 
now largely familiar with the concept and can easily access information about opportunities 
for new projects. However, Both in Vietnam and Cambodia, an expansion of the program or 
a change in program rules would require significant communication efforts for which the 
system is not prepared.  
In Indonesia, the Ministry of Health and local health authorities also conduct public meetings 
to disseminate information about the Jamkesmas program to potential beneficiaries. Social 
media campaigns were also conducted to explain how the program would be implemented 
and the differences with the previous program Askeskin. There are critiques that the 
                                                            
21 Puskesmas refers to a Community health clinic (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat) 30 
 
government budget allocated to conduct social marketing through the media is limited (Mukti 
2008) and a Indonesia Corruption Watch study further explains that despite media campaigns 
the main source of information for the target population remain village officials and village 
health workers
22. In the Philippines the On Demand Application and national validation 
processes were accompanied by a social marketing campaign to increase awareness of the 
National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction and its database, which 
includes the participation of national government agencies, meetings with non-government 
organizations, orientation of local government units (LGUs), and distribution of briefing and 
advocacy materials.  
 
3.3 Payment of Benefits 
Some basic principles should be always taken into account when deciding the most 
appropriate delivery channels for cash benefits. Ideally, all payments should be reliable (i.e. 
on time, predictable), the system should be transparent and provide clear accountability 
channels, it should be safe, and take into consideration both the cost of delivering the benefits 
as well as of receiving it (i.e. both the real and opportunity costs for beneficiaries). Moreover, 
responsibility for payment should be separate from decisions on program eligibility, in order 
to reduce opportunities for fraud and corruption and strengthen internal controls. It is 
important to understand the incentives that lie with service providers to both exclude 
beneficiaries from services (or payments), or provide low quality services, and among 
beneficiaries to claim eligibility or use services to which they are not entitled. Designing 
systems that are sensitive to these issues is key. 
                                                            
22 Indonesia Corruption Watch, Jamkesmas Policy Study, ICW Jakarta 2008 
Key questions – Beneficiary Selection 
  What are the rules for determining eligibility?  
  How well do the eligibility requirements describe the target group? 
   How much margin for discretion by local officials is there?   
  Are eligibility criteria easy to understand for program staff and beneficiaries?   
  What is the awareness among beneficiaries of program rules? 
  How easy are eligibility criteria to verify (for program staff) and comply with (for 
beneficiaries)?31 
 
The Philippines CCT program is an example of a strong payment system that also deals with 
the additional challenges related to CCT, given by the need to verify that beneficiaries have 
complied with conditions on health and education before they can qualify for their quarterly 
payment.  The release of payments undergoes several verification points. The MIS and Cash 
Division units’ database must match, and the list needs to be approved by the Project 
Manager before vouchers can be processed. The payroll also needs to be verified by the Land 
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a government depository bank responsible for transferring 
cash to beneficiaries. By design, this cycle could take at least one month. When DSWD 
receives confirmation that compliance is verified, cash is transferred to program beneficiaries 
electronically by LBP via a cash card. As of October 2010, around 59 percent of the first 
batch (Set 1) of 4Ps beneficiaries and 71 percent of the second batch (Set 2) have an LBP 
account and receive payments through cash cards, while the rest continue to receive their 
grants through Over-The-Counter (OTC) payments.
23 Challenges remain, however. A recent 
spot check survey for instance, found that beneficiaries need to endure long waiting hours 
and travel just to receive their payments through Landbank counters or through ATMs. The 
OTC process also opens up the possibility of bank personnel seeking illegal administrative 
“fees” for processing payment to 4Ps beneficiaries.  Thus, automation and cutting out human 
interaction in the payment process helps to reduce potential governance risks.   Automation 
can create challenges for beneficiaries who are either illiterate and/or not familiar with 
ATMs, so special measures should be taken to address this potential issue. 
On a different scale, the largely manual payment system for social assistance transfers in 
Vietnam also contains checks and balances to mitigate governance risks, though further 
measures could contribute to significantly reducing the likelihood of errors. Responsibility 
for payment of benefits is separate from selection of beneficiaries, reducing the risk of fraud 
or corruption.  Benefits are paid on a monthly basis typically at the commune level, but the 
cost of delivery is high, due to the substantial human resources required in what is largely a 
manual system. Moving away from such a system could increase transparency and 
accountability and reduce errors and costs, particularly in the context of a program expansion 
                                                            
23 Beneficiaries covered in Set 1 consist of about 341,000 households while Set 2 has about 288,000 
households. 32 
 
that would add significantly to the number of transactions required every month.   The 
Government is therefore considering piloting electronic payment systems through alternative 
service providers, such as the post office system or local banks. This could free up processing 
time of local social officers currently involved in the delivery of cash benefits, increasing 
their ability to concentrate on other service delivery functions such as communication and 
outreach to beneficiaries. From a beneficiary perspective, electronic payment methods have 
the potential to increase safety and reliability of the transfer and lower the costs associated 
with going to the payment center on a monthly basis.  
In Indonesia, primary health facilities (Puskesmas) receive payments on a capitation basis 
depending on the number of beneficiaries enlisted in their area
24 and can use the funds to 
reimburse health service provision as well as for outreach activities. Funds are channeled 
using postal service from MOH to Puskesmas accounts all over the country (around 8,000 
Puskesmas). As a consequence of decentralization and at times conflicting local and national 
regulations, there is significant variation in the ability of Puskesmas to access these funds. 
Based on MOH data, by the end of 2010 the accumulated amount of unused capitation funds 
was around IDR 500 billion (about USD 57 million), or almost half the total budget allocated 
for capitation every year.  Hospitals receive Jamkesmas funds as an advance payment based 
historically on their submitted claims. Once claims submitted to the Central Government 
level are verified, hospitals are allowed to use the funds. With the current verification system, 
the number of rejected claims is very low, with only less than one percent of claims rejected. 
Most public hospitals in the network also provide service to beneficiaries of local health 
insurance schemes. Some provincial hospitals deal with more than one local scheme, for 
instance provincial schemes, district-within-province scheme, and those from outside-of-
province districts. This provides on the one hand additional administrative burden to deal 
with multiple payers, but on the other opportunity for hospitals to ‘balance-bill’ other 
schemes for non eligible poor patients. An interesting observations from the CHRI study was 
the use of “brokers” or middle-men by poor patients to ensure that more expensive medical 
                                                            
24 This is balanced by the existence of a “beneficiary quota” for each district. 33 
 
treatment (for example kidney dialysis) requiring hospitalization was covered through the 
program by direct intervention of local politicians intervening on behalf of the beneficiary. 
In Cambodia’s public works projects payments to beneficiaries are linked to satisfactory 
project completion. This is meant to facilitate logistics as well as create a proper incentive 
structure to ensure work attendance and quality of products, though it could potentially 
penalize the poorest.  An important additional reason in the case of food for work projects is 
the difficulty of arranging frequent food distribution. However, even in the case of cash 
payments, human resources constraints currently prevent a higher frequency of payments. To 
ensure that the right people are getting paid and that people are showing up for work, 
households and project committees maintain separate payment records, which are verified by 
the provincial levels and also subject to periodic spot-checks. Measurement sheets are also 
used to record pre and post-work measurements – these measurements are conducted jointly 
by the project committee and the cooperating partner for greater accountability.  
 
Key questions - Payment 
  Who is responsible for payments, the government or a service provider?  
  Can the administration of financial flows be simplified and the cost of delivering and collecting 
payments reduced? 
  Are there controls in place to verify that payments are correct (on time, to the right beneficiary and 
properly accounted for internally)? 34 
 
3.4  Verification and Monitoring  
Program verification and monitoring needs can vary considerably depending on the type of 
SSN. For example, monitoring CCT compliance is a complex task involving many agencies, 
processing significant amounts of information, and requiring transfer of payments in a timely 
fashion based on beneficiaries fulfilling certain responsibilities as required by the program 
(Fiszbein, Schady et al 2009).  Monitoring of a poverty targeted health insurance scheme 
relates more to the eligibility of the beneficiary, and whether the treatment was provided by 
the facility, and was the correct treatment.  Overall, the incentives among the different 
administrative levels of service providers to accurately verify and monitor payment of 
benefits, needs to be designed as part of the program. 
Regardless of the specific monitoring needs, all SSN programs require systems which 
capture program information at different administrative levels, and can generate reports to 
program staff to manage and make decisions in a timely fashion. Many of the Middle Income 
ASEAN countries use MIS Systems specifically designed to manage increasingly complex 
programs. The more developed SSN programs include a combination of tools, besides MIS, 
which cover verification and monitoring. These can include: external and concurrent audits, 
data matching, spot-checks, public disclosure, periodic evaluation.  Bottom up monitoring by 
communities and civil society are also important elements of a verification and monitoring 
system. But typically in lower income settings, monitoring remains ad-hoc, dispersed 
between administrative levels and often manually administered. 
As the Philippines ventured into the implementation of the 4Ps CCT program, the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development worked closely with international experts to 
develop a comprehensive MIS with modules suited to the 4Ps operation flows. Essentially, 
the MIS helps to ensure that every household beneficiary passed all the eligibility criteria and 
receives the correct amount of cash grant depending on current status and compliance with 
program conditionalities. Table 2 illustrates the specification of the six separate modules. The 
modules of the MIS were developed to produce automated reports, such as non-attendance 
reports from compliance verification system, and to update the database to make payments 
accordingly. Given the load of data that flows between processes and the level of technical 35 
 
details necessary to implement the 4Ps, these refinements helped DSWD in ensuring that the 
MIS can effectively support the operations of the 4Ps. Today, the MIS handles the database 
and all data processing requirements for the program at the national, regional, and municipal 
levels. The MIS has built-in validation and duplicate check routines, which help correct 
potential errors in the system.  
Table 2. MIS in the Philippines’ CCT program 
MIS Module  Function 
Household 
Information 
Stores information from the assessment forms completed by the households (the Household 
Assessment Form) and from information processed on eligible households provided by the 
targeting MIS. From the household information, this module produces cross tables or 
queries and helps check for duplicates of household beneficiaries.   
Registration 
Validates the information provided by households at the assessment stage. As some eligible 
households may have reported false information, the registration of the beneficiaries’ 
information is done at village assemblies, where household information contained in the 
database is verified for accuracy. This module produces the final list of registered 
beneficiary households.  
Updates 
Gathers, validates, reports, and records the changes that have occurred on the status or 
condition of any member of the beneficiary household while under the program as well as 
all other relevant information that could change the eligibility of the household. This 
module has all the validation routines according to the rules established in the Operations 




Serves as a monitoring system for verifying compliance of conditionalities, controlling 
payments to beneficiary households, and generating managerial reports and progress 
indicators. This module links payments of grants to compliance of conditionalities.  
Payments 
Controls and produces payments to beneficiaries based on reports of compliance and 
updated household information.  
Grievance 
Redress 
System (GRS)  
Captures, resolves, and analyzes grievances from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about 
the program. This module includes the process of filing and following-up on complaints 
such as generating forms for complaints, updating and processing the information, 
assigning a tracking number to every complaint as well as the person responsible for 
solving it, and producing reports of complaint resolution.  
Source: Olfindo (2010)  36 
 
To further improve the internal quality control and correction mechanisms in the 4Ps, the 
Department of Social Welfare Development conducts spot checks related to the execution of 
different processes, which can serve as the basis for a deeper analysis of the program 
operation at different levels and among the stakeholders involved. Beyond its technical 
merits, spot checks are a key to enhancing the governance, transparency, and accountability 
of the 4Ps as they validate the range of players involved in the program delivery. They can 
also deter fraud and corruption as regional offices fear being subjected to a spot check in the 
future.  The spot check methodology includes interviews with 4Ps beneficiaries, parent 
leaders, the Municipal Links, health providers and school teachers, as well as review of 
health facility records and school attendance records. Furthermore, routine monitoring and 
Spot Checks are complemented by a National Independent Monitoring and Advisory 
Committee, comprising representatives from academia, private sector, religious sector, and 
civil society. 
The information system for a health social assistance program usually covers membership 
verification, payment and complaint handling related to benefit eligibility. In Indonesia, 
Jamkesmas utilization data at the primary level of care is poorly recorded, with health centers 
often not fulfilling reporting requirements. At the hospital level, utilization data is stored at 
the Center for Health Financing Unit (P2JK) at the Ministry of Health since 2008. The unit 
was not prepared to handle this additional new responsibility; data is collected but is not 
analyzed or systematically used for monitoring purposes. To ensure program accountability, 
the Jamkesmas program uses a combination of internal and external audits. The MOH’s 
Inspectorate General (IG) conducts regular internal audits to verify that funds are used 
according to program objectives. External audits are conducted by the State Audit Agency 
(BPKP) for the Jamkesmas program, and the Local Audit Agency or Bawasda for the local 
health insurance schemes (Jamkesda). These agencies audit all MOH units that manage the 
program funds, the Center for Health Financing and two other Directorate Generals at the 
Central level, Local Health Authorities, and all health service providers mostly to verify the 
use of funds and payment for services. Moreover, independent monitoring by civil society is 
increasing. The civil society organization Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) conducts 
regular reviews of program implementation, covering targeting accuracy, beneficiary 37 
 
eligibility and verification, quality of services, as well as beneficiaries’ satisfaction level
25. 
Indonesian media also play an important role. Media coverage on health services for the poor 
and stories on medical cases that lead to household financial catastrophes have generated a 
significant public attention. This has become one of the ways for the public to learn about the 
Jamkesmas program and also, in general, the benefits of having universal health insurance.    
In countries such as Vietnam where SSN programs are still at an earlier stage of 
development,  there is no unified registry of beneficiaries for social assistance, and 
information is transmitted and stored mainly on paper. District social affairs divisions keep 
simple Excel files with beneficiary information but do not routinely transfer this data to 
province or central levels.  Files are often not shared electronically and some electronic data 
is removed after a short period of computer storage, as personal records of beneficiaries are 
kept in paper forms at the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs’ (MOLISA) local 
office. MOLISA has no real-time date data on beneficiary numbers and actual spending. 
Files from the district level are transmitted to the province level with a significant lag, and 
data are not consolidated to create a unique dataset, missing an important opportunity for 
cross-checking of beneficiaries across districts and monitoring of the program at the national 
level. Responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation are divided among different levels 
within MOLISA, and branches, but there is no consistent and standardized procedure at the 
national level.  Periodic supervision visits are organized at the province and district levels to 
oversee implementation and identify and address problems. Human resources are scarce and 
therefore the overall frequency of visits is quite low. More comprehensive monitoring by 
District staff takes place when they can afford the time, usually once a year. The visits 
generally assess performance based on proper processing of applications, inclusion of all 
potential beneficiaries, correct and on-time payments, and the existence of complaints. 
Monitoring visits tend to look at different issues across communes, there is no coherent 
monitoring and evaluation framework, or systematic evaluation of policy results.  
                                                            
25 Since 2008, ICW has released two reports of the Jamkesmas implementation review. The first report in 2009 
highlights the inaccuracy of targeting beneficiaries, and cardholder’s complaints of discrimination in service, 
complex administration requirements and extra payments, and not much has changed in the 2010 report. 38 
 
 
3.5 Grievance redress 
Grievance redress systems (GRS) provide an important means of reducing EFC in Safety Net 
Programs. Designing a robust GRM reduces inclusion and exclusion errors, prevents fraud 
and collusion in benefit payments and provides beneficiaries and those who are eligible but 
excluded an opportunity for redress. Key features of an effective GRS are an information 
campaign that provides information to the public on the features/entitlement of the program 
and the GRS i.e. how to register a complaint; a dedicated staff/unit which logs in complaints 
and monitors resolutions within a time-bound period; and sanctions against those who break 
program rules. GRSs often include demand based approaches which allow third-parties or 
civil society to help monitor or expose problems in program implementation. 
In ASEAN, practice varies considerable from countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia 
which have a vibrant civil society monitoring the programs to countries such as Vietnam 
where redress is through local governments and party representatives at the commune level. 
In the Philippines the 4Ps’ GRS aims to capture, resolve, and analyze grievances about the 
program.  The GRS design for 4Ps features a grievance database, which tracks the nature, 
origin, location and status of complaints such as targeting errors, payment irregularities, 
fraud, and corruption. The GRS developed an application currently being tested by the 
regions. The PMO has established a complaint reporting mechanisms, including Text Hotline 
using DSWD SMS platform, email, Facebook, Google Sites, and Twitter. In the first quarter 
of 2010, about 13,500 complaints were received and 83 percent of those were related to 
payments. Establishing these modern avenues for grievance submission is important, as they 
offer accessible, alternative channels to the standard means by which people complain, i.e., to 
Key questions – Monitoring and Verification 
   How is information flow managed and updated? Is there an adequate system (MIS) that captures 
information that staff engage with at each stage of the program? 
  Are corrective actions taken on the basis of information generated?   
  To what extent are beneficiaries or third-parties involved in monitoring and verification? 
  Is there a system of beneficiary/payment spot checks? 
  Do staff face incentives/penalties to reduce Error, Fraud and Corruption? 
  Is there a separation of functions between processing, payment and monitoring? 39 
 
the village head or to the project facilitator, which in some cases could represent the subject 
of the complaint.  
In Vietnam the first point of contact for people to place complaints related to social 
assistance is usually the neighborhood chief, but citizens can also address directly the Ward 
People Committee’s social officer at public meetings, which are held on a regular basis. 
Complaints are usually resolved at the village level, with citizens applying to the village 
chief and party chief with their cases. Only if these cannot be resolved are they sent to the 
commune level, but this is not common
26. Complaints are most frequently related to 
instances of unclear eligibility criteria, for example, regarding people with disabilities. While 
there are ways for people to place complaints, the current system does not provide a 
systematic channel for grievance redress. The feedback system for social assistance and other 
social programs in Vietnam relies on existing spaces for discussion that are rooted in the 
government’s organizational structure, there are no alternative channels for beneficiaries to 
place complaints.  Minutes of these meetings are taken and records of the hearings are kept. 
However, once this information is recorded, it does not appear to be consulted or tracked in 
any way and therefore cannot be used either to inform policy decisions, or to provide follow 
up of individual cases.  Overall accountability is focused on upward reporting rather than 
horizontal or downward accountability. 
In Indonesia, the Jamkesmas program guidelines only provide a generic description of how 
the GRS should be conducted which leads to variation in its implementation at the sub-
national level. Health facilities in the network provide means for Jamkesmas members to 
place complaints, usually in the form of a complaint box. Complaints that cannot be resolved 
at the provider and district level are referred to the higher level or directly to the central 
Government. In addition to this hierarchical GRS described in the guidelines, the Center for 
Health Financing (P2JK) at the MOH has established an additional, more direct, mechanism 
using telephone and text messaging. Unfortunately, up to now there is no database of 
complaints/grievances to enable proper tracking and redress of complaints and systematic 
                                                            
26 A commune visited in Ha Giang, for instance, reported that only 2 cases regarding D67 had been taken to the 
commune level in the past.  40 
 
analysis of the nature and type of complaints. The CHRI study found that GRM was poorly 
developed and most beneficiaries were unfamiliar with who and where to send complaints. 
Those that did complain resorted to travelling to district health offices to petition health 
officials or sent letters or text messages to local government. The major source of grievance 
was primarily exclusion (i.e. not receiving a health card) or not receiving adequate services 
from the hospital provider. Again many of the grievances stem from a lack of information 
about eligibility and program benefits. 
In Cambodia, people can complain to the public works project committee, the cooperating 
partner or even provincial level authorities (PPMU), but no systematic grievance and redress 
system is in place. Interviewed beneficiaries reported interacting frequently with the Project 
Committee leader and the village chief, and not necessarily with higher authorities. In Cash 
for Work projects within the Emergency and Food Assistance Program (EFAP), a program 
phone number for complaints is shared at initial public meetings and posted at commune 
boards. Program officers reported that the monitoring mechanisms, involving three different 
levels, as well as reporting requirements of cooperating partners (donors) helped to reduce 







  Is there a dedicated Grievance Redress /complaints handling Mechanism? 
   Is the GRS linked to the MIS? 
  Are there dedicated staff to log complaints and track resolution of complaints? 
  Are beneficiaries aware of how to register a complaint? 
  If complaints are not handled in a timely fashion are there any sanctions? 41 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
The country contexts and the complexity and maturity of individual safety net programs we 
looked at differ greatly, and this is the reflected in the range of issues that impact the 
effective delivery of programs, as well as in the awareness and interest in mitigating 
governance risks. Politics increasingly matters in SSN programs. In vibrant democracies with 
a free media such as the Philippines, the rapidly expanding CCT program is under increasing 
public scrutiny.  Over the past couple of years, the government has responded by addressing 
governance challenges. Also largely driven by growing public scrutiny related to the scaling-
up of various poverty targeted SSN programs, Indonesia is increasing efforts to understand 
governance challenges and improve the administration of SSN programs. In Vietnam and 
Cambodia governments are considering scaling up programs and strengthening the safety net 
system. Existing programs are small and, in the case of Cambodia, largely donor driven. An 
increase in coverage and in the scale of operations will require an assessment of whether the 
existing governance and administrative arrangements at all levels are sufficiently robust to 
handle the expansion.  
Based on the case studies and the application of the framework presented in this paper, we 
make some final observations regarding the main governance challenges faced by safety net 
programs in ASEAN countries. These are meant to highlight some key elements which have 
emerged from our limited sample of programs, and are not prescriptive.  
On the supply side, setting clear roles and responsibilities across levels of government and 
institutions involved in the delivery of benefits is a key ingredient for making accountability 
relationships work. The programs observed mostly operate in decentralized contexts, and 
stand at risk of overlapping institutional responsibilities and incentives across different 
government levels, with a corresponding diffusion of responsibilities. Moreover, in a context 
of coverage expansion and proliferation of new programs, the risk of creating increasingly 
complex systems characterized by cross-incentives is high. Lack of coordination across 
implementing institutions poses risks for program effectiveness and can also decrease 
accountability. At the individual program level, in several cases the “rules of the game” for 42 
 
identifying and selecting beneficiaries are ambiguous and not implemented consistently. 
Clear and transparent rules of the game reduce opportunities to exercise discretion, and help 
build program credibility among beneficiaries and other stakeholders.  
On the demand side, a key challenge in delivering non-contributory cash benefits is how to 
ensure that beneficiaries are aware of the program and are given a voice. Beneficiaries of 
social assistance programs tend to be poor and often suffer from exclusion. They are the least 
likely to have the voice and power to hold service providers accountable and all of this is true 
also in the cases we observed.  On the positive side, in all the programs observed 
communities were at some stage involved in the program decisions. How to further 
strengthen this involvement in a transparent manner and how to provide appropriate avenues 
for beneficiaries to seek grievance redress remain a challenge. Finally, administrative 
capacity is likely to represent a constraint as governments seek to deliver increasingly 
complex programs to a growing number of beneficiaries over a wide geographically 
dispersed area. Large investments in investment capacity are unlikely, but it is possible to 
think about context appropriate solutions that can contribute to reduce governance risk.  
 
  Main Governance Challenges 
Supply side  Accountability and incentives in decentralized contexts 
Fragmentation of programs 
Possibility for discretion in application of program rules 
Inadequate monitoring and evaluation 
Demand side  Beneficiaries tend to lack voice to influence providers/ policy-makers 
Administrative systems  Administrative capacity constraints (collecting program information, 
etc.) 
 
4.1 Accountability and incentives in decentralized contexts 
Program design has to take into consideration how best to shape incentives and 
strengthen accountability in a decentralized context. Decentralization is a major issue in 
most ASEAN countries, where local governments are now in charge of delivering many 43 
 
critical services, including social services. In some countries (Indonesia, Philippines) the 
decentralization process is far advanced, but in others it is more recent (Vietnam, Cambodia). 
In all cases, involving multiple actors in the delivery of a service or a product, can diffuse 
responsibility and result in a lack of accountability. It is important for program design to 
develop appropriate institutional incentives and ensure clear roles and responsibilities across 
government levels.  In particular, when responsibilities for financing and implementation 
across government levels are separate, as is often the case for social assistance, ensure that 
providers are held accountable for program outcomes can be challenging from a governance 
perspective. Shifting responsibility for program implementation closer to citizens can, 
however, also help strengthen accountability. This is particularly true in the case of social 
service delivery because of its importance for the poor and vulnerable, who tend to suffer 
from greater exclusion.  
4.2 Fragmentation of programs 
A focus on improving effectiveness of individual programs is not sufficient. Expanding 
coverage and adding objectives to existing programs, as well as starting new programs, 
increases the risk of creating increasingly complex systems characterized by cross-incentives. 
Lack of coordination across implementing institutions poses risks for program effectiveness 
and can decrease accountability. The challenges of coordination are amplified when there are 
multiple funding sources for programs, as is often the case in lower income settings in which 
aid represents a large share of social spending (Cambodia and Lao for example). Programs 
should ideally be part of a well articulated and coordinated social protection system. Existing 
institutional and political economy circumstances will determine the best solution on a case-
by-case basis, no “single model” exists. Some ASEAN members, such as the Philippines, 
have recently made significant efforts to improve institutional and policy convergence. The 
Government created an inter-agency National Social Welfare and Protection Cluster and 
charged it with consolidating over 60 existing programs led by various government agencies 
into a single national social welfare strategy with a view toward reallocating resources 
towards more effective programs.  44 
 
4.3 Possibility for discretion in application of program rules 
Socialization and communication strategies are essential to ensure access to eligible 
beneficiaries, particularly in the context of rapidly expanding programs or changes in 
program objectives and eligibility criteria. Safety net programs target beneficiaries that 
tend to be among the most excluded members of society and low capacity at the commune 
level is a challenge. The communication and outreach strategies to inform potential 
beneficiaries of their rights and to seek people in need of social assistance are key in this 
context. Common forms of communication include community bulletins, verbal 
communication by local officers and village committees, TV/radio or a loudspeaker system. 
Nonetheless, it can be hard for certain groups to access information and in most cases a 
proactive approach is necessary. The most common reasons for exclusion include language 
and literacy barriers (particularly for minority groups), living in remote locations or lack of 
time to participate in public meetings. Particularly in a context where program rules tend to 
change frequently, or when significant program expansions are planned, greater 
communication and training efforts will be required to ensure that citizen are aware of their 
rights and able to voice their needs and concerns.   
4.4 Voice 
Community participation can play a very important role in strengthening 
accountability and guaranteeing program credibility among beneficiaries.  In all 
programs reviewed communities were at some stage involved in the selection of 
beneficiaries, or in validating initial selections by other means. Community involvement 
appears to pay off. Greater local participation at different stages of program implementation 
(beneficiary identification, project selection in public works, social audits, etc.) can increase 
beneficiaries’ buy-in and understanding of the program and ability to hold providers 
accountable, which in turn improves outcomes. Involving communities and beneficiaries in 
general, is very important for program legitimacy. For example, a pilot study conducted in 
Indonesia comparing Proxy Means Test and Community Targeting in a cash transfer program 
showed that while the PMT method had the lowest mis-targeting rates, satisfaction and 45 
 
community buy-in were higher for community targeting methods. Fewer complaints were 
reported, and village heads were more likely to consider the program appropriate. 
 
4.5 Administrative capacity constraints 
Collecting and using program information to monitor implementation, and improve 
program administration to reduce governance risks is key. In most countries there 
remains a strong need for better program monitoring and understanding of program 
effectiveness. MIS are not simple data “containers”, but a powerful tool to facilitate program 
oversight and accountability. Setting up an appropriate MIS should be a priority when 
designing new programs, but systems need not be high tech. Countries with weaker 
administrative capacity, for example, can start with more basic data collection tools, such as 
developing common formats for maintaining beneficiary records and storing them in ways 
that facilitate information sharing and tracking. Introducing more modern technologies helps 
to reduce errors and cost, and to improve the overall quality of the data. However, data 
collection methods, as well as the MIS itself, should initially be appropriate to country and 
program capacity and gradually develop more advanced systems. 
Administrative capacity and available technology at least partially shape the menu of 
options, but should not prevent countries from thinking about governance. Where 
greater administrative capacity exists, program managers will have a broader set of tools 
available to improve governance. High workload combined with lack of administrative 
budgets and limited capacity of social officers, particularly at the lower levels of government, 
can constrain choices and affect program outcomes. Having more, well-paid, staff can reduce 
governance risks such as corruption and improve incentives for service delivery. The 
innovative use of technology, such as advanced management information systems, global 
position (GPS) tracking and the use of mobile phones for payments and grievance redress, or 
the modernization of payment mechanisms including through electronic payment to reduce 
EFC, can also mitigate governance risks. However, following governance principles can be 
as “simple” as ensuring separation of functions, documenting processes and functions in 46 
 
operational manuals, providing beneficiaries with opportunities to voice concerns and 
addressing claims in a timely manner. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that programs evolve, and so do risks. Programs 
are dynamic, particularly in the first years of implementation, as they adapt and evolve to 
existing conditions and constraints. The nature of governance risks at each stage of program 
implementation can therefore change over time and program managers should reassess 
periodically whether mitigation measures are appropriate. Process evaluation, monitoring of 
financial flows, tracking of complaints, and analysis of program results, if conducted 
regularly can provide a solid evidence base on which to base decisions to tweak programs in 
response to emerging risk and program weaknesses.  
 
V.  Areas for Future Work 
The work undertaken constitutes a first step in developing a governance agenda for social 
protection in the region. A lot remains to be done to consolidate experience, document 
evidence and deepen the engagement on multiple fronts, including both program and sector 
level analysis. This work has highlighted some questions and topics for further analysis of 
the governance agenda in SSN programs, which we summarize here as a means of 
maintaining the dialogue going forward.  
Consolidate experience. This report only looked at four case studies, but initial finding 
suggests that there is considerable room for cross-regional learning from successful 
experiences (i.e. Philippines). Additional efforts to document governance challenges and map 
existing innovative governance practices in ASEAN SSN programs are welcome. Further 
documentation of programs’ challenges, failures and successes would be of use to program 
managers as countries consider how to build and expand their social protection systems.  
Document evidence. There is very little evidence and evaluation of what works in social 
protection governance, as well as of the cost-effectiveness of governance interventions 
themselves. A large agenda lies ahead, focusing on improving ways to measure governance 47 
 
both for monitoring and evaluation of safety net programs themselves and for the evaluation 
of governance interventions. Two areas stand out in particular. 
i.  Demand-side interventions in particular have received growing attention, but evidence 
on what works in practice – and in which contexts – remains limited. There are big 
issues of elite capture, access to information and channels for use of information, 
capacity, etc. At the same time, build evidence on the complementarities between 
demand and supply side interventions to make programs accountable. Efforts to 
strengthen beneficiary involvement for program monitoring must be met by 
Government support for results to be sustainable, in what should be a mutually 
reinforcing cycle. 
ii.  Technology investments appear to have significant benefit. A number of programs use 
MIS systems linked to comprehensive IT based complaints handling systems. A 
systematic review and evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of these systems would be 
beneficial, as these can be costly investments. 
 
Deepen the engagement. It is increasingly clear that political economy cannot be 
underestimated, and that a deeper understanding of context-specific factors influencing 
program results, as well as the sustainability of programs, is needed in the region. Engaging 
think-tanks and researchers in the ASEAN region to develop this new frontier of research is 
important as governments face decisions to scale up existing programs and develop new 
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Annex 2: Overview of diagnostic questions per stage of a SSN program 





Are eligibility criteria easy to understand for program staff and beneficiaries? 
How easy are eligibility criteria to verify (for program staff) and comply with (for beneficiaries)? 
Are thorough eligibility checks carried out at the outset of the claim? 
What is the awareness among beneficiaries and communities of program rules (rights and obligations), eligibility 
criteria, and beneficiary lists? 
Do program staff, communities, and individuals receive training to understand program rules? 
Processing of 
applications 
Is there a separation of function or checks and balance between processing, payment and monitoring? 
Do monitoring and verification systems allow for checks and control throughout processing of claim? 
Do staff have adequate basic material support to perform their function? 
Is capacity sufficient given the number of processes staff control? 
Is that capacity commensurate with caseload? 
Does administrative capacity exist elsewhere that is currently not used in program? 
To what extent is administration of program budgeted for? 
Are program staff remunerated to administer the program? 
To what extent are staff incentivised to reduce EFC entering program? 
What type of training do staff receive to eliminate EFC in processing? 
Can processing of claims be automated? 
Payment  Can payments be made directly to beneficiaries? 
Can the administration of financial flows be simplified? 
Does proper monitoring and accounting of cash flows take place? 
Are internal quality control processes in place including evaluation, feedback loops and correction mechanisms? 
Are controls in place to verify registered beneficiaries have received regular payment? 
Are payment providers properly supervised by responsible ministry? 
Are there independent feedback options for staff and beneficiaries (e.g. complaint lines)? 
Verification 
and monitoring 
Are incentives aligned with institutional responsibilities? 
Are incentives aligned with performance outcomes of the provision of services? 
Are there formal agreements for those involved in implementation (multi-tier government or service level 
agreements)  
Do these agreements specify performance levels and ways of recording performance? 
Can these agreements be enforced and are appeals possible? 
Is an adequate (captures key program information that staff engage with at each stage of program ) MIS system in 
use? 
Are MIS systems integrated? 
Are corrective actions taken on the basis of feedback and accountability systems? 
Is there involvement of third parties in providing oversight in financial management? 
To what extent are program outcomes communicated to beneficiaries and program staff? 
To what extent is outcome data benchmarked and communicated to beneficiaries and program staff? 
To what extent are beneficiaries or civil society involved in drawing up and verifying beneficiary lists, payments and 
overall monitoring and verification? 
Is their involvement free from interference from program staff or community leaders? 
Can beneficiaries and civil society hold service providers to account on beneficiary selection and payments? 
Does dedicated capacity exist for monitoring and verification (e.g. audit, monitoring, and fraud investigations)? 
Do communities and civil society have the knowledge and resources to support beneficiary selection and monitoring 
and verification? 
Does the involvement of particular actors in monitoring and verification compromise the participation or capacity-
building of others? 
Can more capacity be allocated to data-matching processes? 
Exit of  Do monitoring and verification allow the program to identify the moment of exit of beneficiary? 53 
 
beneficiary 
Cross-cutting   Is inter-institutional coordination effective in the core executive? 
Does the core executive take ownership of the overall social safety net? 
Does strategic planning on SSN provision take place in the core executive?  
Does oversight independent of government and political influence exist? 
Is inter-institutional coordination effective at sectoral level? 
Does a sectoral champion exist for SSN programs? 
Are different service providers coordinated at sectoral level? 
To what extent are decisions taken on SSN programs subject to political interference? 
Does strategic planning on SSN provision take place at sectoral level? 
How consistent and sustainable is the SSN system?  
How consistent and sustainable is the funding of the program and administration of the program? 
Does sectoral audit capacity exist?  
Is this audit capacity integrated or fragmented across the administration of the program? 
How independent is sectoral audit? Is it subject to political influence?  
Have responsibilities and lines of accountability been properly mapped out? 
Are these responsibilities and lines of accountability well-documented (e.g. job descriptions and standard operating 
procedures)? 
Are these responsibilities and lines of accountability widely known by all in the program? 
Are these responsibilities and lines of accountability enforced? 
Are there mechanisms to support accountability arrangements (e.g. complaints mechanisms and mutual accountability 
mechanisms)? Are accountability systems conflicting? 
How complex is the administration of the program? Are there ways to eliminate stages or agency without 
compromising administrative capacity? 
Does a civil service code or law exist? 
Does the civil service award pay for performance and evaluate performance of civil servants? 
Does the civil service incorporate clear guidance on malfeasance and how to address irregularities? 
Does specific professional certification exist in the delivery of SSN programs? 
Do adequate laws exist that deal with program irregularities? 
Do adequate laws exist that apply to procurement in a SSN program?  
Are these laws visibly applied in the SSN context? 
Are sanctions embedded in program rules? 
Are sanctions applied in cases of malfeasance? 











Annex 3: Overview of Governance and Administrative Challenges and 
Responses 
Supply-side governance challenges in a SSN program 
Governance 
challenge 






and accountability  
Macro-level: Encourage central 
coordination in the core 
executive of cross-sectoral  
responsibilities and programs 
Encourage a strong and 
independent SAI to provide 
oversight in the program 
Core executive  Inter-institutional coordination is a problem in many 
countries (LAC, OECD  as well as EAP) 
Main issues involve the lack of coordination between 
ministries, which can impact on government strategy in 
social protection, planning of social protection, lines of 
responsibility and budgeting of programs – many OECD 
countries use interministerial committees and steering 
groups to better coordinate provision 
Strong oversight (mostly SAI)  independent of 
government is common in the social protection regime 
any OECD  country ( The US uses strong parliamentary 
oversight to monitor performance of Social Security 
Administration; Canada ) 
Meso-level: Encourage the 
creation of a central coordinating 
body for all social protection 
programs 
Encourage the creation of 





Ministry and core 
executive 
Inter-institutional coordination is also a problem at 
sectoral level.  
Examples from LAC and EPA show that often a social 
protection system is not well-coordinated with competing 
programs managed in different ministries 
Programs in many countries (see e.g. Bangladesh)  show 
high turnover and lack of sustainability 
Moreover, many bodies and agencies are involved in the 
implementation of programs, which can lead to absent or 
fragmented accountability 
Most OECD countries manage and coordinate the social 
security systems through one dedicated body, a champion 
of the system and SSN programs (e.g. Centrelink in 
Australia, Service Canada, or the Social Security 
Administration in the US) 
Strong sectoral audit capacity is desirable in providing 
oversight (internal audit and analysis divisions) 
Most OECD countries operate under an integrated  
sectoral performance framework with outcome measures, 
which is agreed with the core executive (examples are the 
US, the UK , and Canada) 
Micro-level: Assign clear 
responsibilities and lines of 
accountability 
Document the responsibilities 
and lines of accountability 
Support the creation of a shared 
understanding between all 
involved in program 
Promote the enforcement of 
responsibilities and lines of 
accountability 
Support accountability 
mechanisms and promote 
integration of arrangements 
Consider the division of 
responsibilities in a program or 
introduce checks and balance 







All involved in implementing the program need to 
understand their responsibilities and lines of 
accountability (e.g. see LAC examples) – Brazil has 
developed tables listing each component of program 
operation and which agency is responsible for 
management and monitoring 
Division of responsibilities between processing, payment 
and monitoring in OECD countries is a main way to limit 
error, fraud and corruption from occurring 
Reducing the complexity of administration (less reliance 
on a large number of actors or a multi-tiered system) has 
proved effective in OECD countries to improve delivery –
there may be a trade-off between reducing complexity and 
administrative capacity 
Clear documentation of responsibilities  (e.g. job 
descriptions) and the use of standard operating procedures 
in all countries  are essential in creating a shared 
understanding off roles, responsibilities and obligations 
As stated earlier, LAC examples show that the creation of 
shared understanding has to be supported by an effective 55 
 
  communication strategy and training 
LAC also shows the use of other mechanisms such as 
mutual accountability (allowing the beneficiary to hold 
service providers to account) in SSN program 
LAC also shows clear and simple eligibility requirements 
across the social protection are easier to implement for 
staff and easier to understand for beneficiaries; This point 
also speaks to the relationship between complexity and 
EFC 
Lack of alignment 
of incentives to 
program 
implementation  
Macro-level: Encourage the 
creation of standards 
commensurate with a 
professional modern meritocratic 
civil service 
 
Core executive  A meritocratic professional civil service has been shown 
in OECD to promote service delivery.
27 Such a system 
consists among others of: transparency in appointment; 
performance-related pay; effective performance 
evaluation;  an independent redress system 
Two main areas relevant to SSN programs stand out from 
the OECD experience: performance evaluation through 
results-based management  (e.g. Canada) and adequate 
sanctions against those committing irregularities 
(disciplining staff has also shown to be effective in 
healthcare provision in the US); and professional 
certification (e.g. UK)  
Meso and micro-levels: Ensure 
that incentives are aligned with 
implementation 
Promote the creation and 
enforcement of formal 
agreements on performance 
levels and incentives between 
actors in implementation  
Ministry, 
program staff and 
potentially civil 
society 
Ensuring that incentives are aligned with implementation 
responsibilities is an integral aspect of how programs are 
structured. Examples from LAC show that in multi-tier 
systems some countries such as  Brazil choose to award 
financial subsidies linked to quality of performance  
There is much evidence in the OECD about the 
importance of service level agreements and also about 
some perverse effects that some arrangements may have 
There is less evidence on what constitutes the optimal 
number of participants in a SSN program – OECD has 
tended towards simplification 
Lack of 
information to 
adjust program  
Meso and micro-levels: Ensure 
that adequate program 
information exist to monitor 
performance and alignment of 
incentives 
Encourage transparent sharing of 





Management information systems (MIS) are essential to 
see what problems exist in a program or where problems 
in accountability may exist – without MIS it is difficult to 




Ensuring the rule 
of law 
Macro-level: Ensuring that laws 
exist on the books that punish 
irregularities in SSN programs 
Ensuring the procurement law 
exists and is applied to large 
scale contracts 
Core executive  Laws dealing with malfeasance and corruption are a legal 
bare minimum 
There is still debate about the role of institutions in 
reducing corruption
28 
Large-scale procurement is most likely to result in 
malfeasance (example of food stamps program in US) 
 
Meso and micro-levels: Ensuring 
that law is applied by 
incorporating national law in 
program rules 
Ensuring consistency between 
program rules and national law is 
Ministry  Adequate sanctions can prove a powerful deterrence – all 
OECD countries continue to increase sanctions 
Prosecutions in OECD countries typically occur in high 
value and high profile cases – minor cases are dealt with 
through administrative penalty 
It is clear that any sanctions regime has to be seen to be 
                                                            
27 See for instance, the activities of OECD-SIGMA in East and Central Europe, www.sigmaweb.org (accessed 
April 2010).  
28 The debate takes place between those who look at the effectiveness of particular initiatives to combat 
corruption (Huther and Shah 2000) and those that link corruption mitigation to wider institutional reform (e.g. 
democratisation and enforcing the rule of law) (Kaufman 1998) 56 
 





Meso-level  Ministry/financial 
institutions 
Making electronic payments direct to beneficiaries 
appears practice in most OECD countries and is an 
efficient and effective to stop leakages from occurring 
Eliminating the number of organizations, levels of 
government, and officials involved in handling money 
appears  an effective way to reduce the opportunities of 
error and corruption 
Monitoring the process of cash flows in a system is a bare 
minimum to reduce the risk of leakages 
In Latin America, the importance of  internal quality 
control has been shown to be an important weakness that 
needs to be addressed 
Basic verification of receipt of payment by registered 
beneficiaries 
Minimising the length of time payments stay in the 
accounts of payment  bodies (e.g. post office and 
consolidating ministry and payment agency accounts were 
particular factors in reducing leakages (mostly corruption) 
in Kyrgyzstan 
Feedback functions such as complaint mechanisms, 
outlines, and independent appeals are in place  in most all 
OECD countries,  in the LAC region, and common 
throughout 
  Micro-level Civil  society  Third-party  monitoring in payments has proved in some 
instances as in Latin America an effective way to monitor 
the program – there are no prescribed ways to do this  
 
Demand driven governance challenges in SSN programs  





Beneficiary selection  Making information 
available to stakeholders 
Making 
beneficiaries aware 
of eligibility criteria, 
program rules, and 
beneficiary lists 
Communities 
and civil society 
Evidence in OECD countries and 
indeed in MICs and LICs shows that 
most all programs are moving to 
making more information available to 
the claimant 
Some OECD countries have moved to 









Much evidence on the importance of 
building in social accountability 
mechanisms 
LAC examples show that social 
accountability mechanisms are a 
complement to top-down social 
accountability mechanisms – no clear 
prescription on which mechanism work 
best 
 








Evidence from LAC shows a variety of 
payment mechanisms but the 
importance of continuous monitoring of 










other regions or 
Communities 
and civil society 
Evidence from LICs such as Uganda 
(Error! Reference source not found.) 
show that benchmarking and  program 
outcome information can be a powerful 












Much evidence on the importance of 
building in social accountability 
mechanisms 
LAC examples show that social 
accountability mechanisms are a 
complement to top-down social 
accountability mechanisms – no clear 
prescription on which mechanism work 
best 
 
Exit of beneficiary  See points made under 
monitoring and verification 
    
 
Administrative challenges in SSN programs  





Beneficiary selection  Lack of capacity in 
communities and civil 
society to support selection 
of beneficiaries in SSN  
from the bottom-up from the 
bottom-up 
Involving civil 
society in social 
audit with known 
capacity 
Communities 
and civil society 
Much evidence on the importance of 
building in social accountability 
mechanisms 
Anecdotal evidence from Bangladesh 
suggests that relying on civil society 
with known capacity may prevent 
communities from building up own 
capacity 
Evidence from LAC suggests that 
training is important to build up 
capacity. LAC examples also question  
to what extent civil society actors are 
held to account in SSN programs 
Lack of knowledge about 
beneficiary selection in 








Evidence in CCTs suggest that training 
and communications strategies are of 
key importance in explaining the rules 
of a SSN program 
Processing of 
applications 
Poor quality of staff  
introduce errors in the 
processing of claims 
Training of staff 
Results-based 
management 
Program staff  OECD evidence suggest that training is 
effective in dealing with staff error 
OECD evidence suggest that results-
based management reduces error in 
processing 
Low number of staff to 
implement program 
Ring-fence part of 
the budget for 
administration 
Seek administrative 





Evidence from Bangladesh and 
Kyrgyzstan suggest that administration 
is often not budgeted for or added on 
existing responsibilities of staff without 
reward 
Lack of knowledge about 
processing rules in program 







Evidence in CCTs suggest that training 
and communications strategies are of 
key importance to explain the rules of 
the SSN program 
Low IT capacity  Providing additional 




Evidence from OECD shows that 
increased IT capacity reduces the 
number of errors made in processing 
compared s with more staff-based 
processes 
Payment of benefits  No inhouse capacity to pay 
benefits 
Simplify payments 
to process them 
Program staff 
and ministry 
Reliance on others to pay benefits adds 
a degree of complexity to processing 58 
 
electronically  payments, which can compromise the 
integrity of the payment system 
Evidence from the OECD suggest that 
payment directly to the beneficiary 
reduces leakage 
Lack of knowledge about 
payment rules in program 







Evidence in CCTs suggest that training 
and communications strategies are of 




Low IT capacity   Providing additional 




OECD evidence shows that data-
matching is an extremely cost-effective 
way to verify eligibility information 




Invest in facilities 




OECD evidence shows that 
investigators who follow a risk-based 
approach are extremely cost-effective 
LAC evidence shows importance of not 
over-auditing and following a risk-led 
approach - evaluation and audit can be 
expensive  
OECD evidence suggest that 
complaints systems are important and 
also a cost-effective way of 
investigating irregularities 
Lack of knowledge about 
monitoring and verification 








Evidence in CCTs suggest that training 
and communications strategies are of 
key importance to explain the rules of 
the SSN program 
Lack of material support to 
undertake monitoring and 
verification 
Ensure staff  has 
basic support 




Evidence from several middle income 
countries  (e.g. Ukraine) suggests that 
providing staff with inadequate support  
(e.g. no reimbursement for travel or 
lack of transportation) has a significant 
effect on effectiveness 
Lack of capacity in 
communities and civil 
society to support 
verification and monitoring 
Involving civil 
society in social 
audit with known 
capacity 
Communities 
and civil society 
Much evidence on the importance of 
using social accountability mechanisms 
in SSN programs 
Anecdotal evidence from Bangladesh 
suggests that relying on civil society 
with known capacity may prevent 
communities from building up own 
capacity 
Evidence from LAC suggests that 
training is important to build up 
capacity. LAC examples also question  
to what extent civil society actors are 
held to account 
LAC review further highlights that 
social accountability should be a 
complement to not a substitute for 
formal audits 
Exit of beneficiary  See points made under 
monitoring and verification 
    
Source: van Stolk, Christian, To strengthen the governance dimension of social safety net programs in the ASEAN region, 






ASKESKIN   Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin (Social health insurance for the 
poor, Indonesia) 
ASEAN     Association of South East Asian Nations 
BAWASDA   Badan Waspada Daerah (Regional Audit Agency, Indonesia) 
BPKP      Badan Periksaan Keuangan Pemerintah (State Audit Agency) 
CCT   Conditional  Cash  Transfer 
CHRI      Center for Health Research Indonesia 
CVS   Complaints  and  Verification  System 
DSWD      Department of Social Welfare and Development 
EFC      Error, Fraud and Corruption 
FFW    Food  for  Work 
JAMKESDA   Jaminan Kesahatan Daerah (Regional health insurance scheme, Indonesia) 
JAMAKESMAS Jaminan Kesahatan Masayrakat  (National health insurance scheme, 
Indonesia) 
LBP      Land Bank of the Philippines 
LIC     Low  Income  Country 
GRS   Grievance  Redress  System 
MIC   Middle  Income  Country 
MIS     Management  Information  System 
OECD      Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
SSN   Social  Safety  Net 
P4        Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, Philippines 
PNPM   Program Nasional Pembangunan Masyarakat (National community 
empowerment program, Indonesia) 
PUSKESMAS  Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat (Community health clinic, Indonesia) 
PWP    Public  Works  Program 
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